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Board ties in the form of interlocking directorates are created when directors of one company serve
on the board of another. Such ties have received much attention from management scholars and pol-
icymakers. Scholars have long argued that board ties provide a potential mechanism by which top
executives can coordinate firm decisions and reduce competition (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Burt,
1983; Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer, Singh, & Friedland, 1986; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, con-
cern about board ties among academics and policymakers has declined in recent years for several rea-
sons. First, for many years, the Clayton Act has prohibited interlocking directorates among firms that
compete in the same industry, if combining these firms would violate antitrust laws. This has created
a widespread perception that directors no longer play a significant role in interfirm collusion (Buch-
Hansen, 2014). Although interlocks between competitors do exist (in possible violation of the Clay-
ton Act), they have never been very common, and there is little empirical evidence that they have a
significant influence on firm performance (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Mizruchi, 1996). Sec-
ond, empirical evidence indicates that board interlock ties are seldom reconstituted following the
accidental loss of such ties; scholars have interpreted these findings as suggesting that board ties are
not created for strategic purposes (Palmer, 1983; see review by Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal, Boivie, &
Chng, 2006). In addition, it has become increasingly impractical to form and maintain board interlock
ties in which the chief executive officer (CEO) of one firm serves on another firm's board. Share-
holders have pressured top executives to serve on a very limited number of boards due to concerns
that “over-boarded” executives may not be able to manage their own firms properly or fulfill their
duties as directors (Harris & Shimizu, 2004). These factors are generally perceived to have signifi-
cantly constrained the use of board ties as a strategy for managing competitive uncertainty.
In the present study, we challenge the widespread assumption that board ties no longer help firms
reduce competition. We suggest that firms are able to manage competitive uncertainty by creating a
specific kind of board tie that circumvents regulation and the other constraints on interlock ties
described above. In particular, we contend that relatively high competitive uncertainty in an industry
will encourage firms to appoint the friends of rivals' CEOs to their boards to facilitate interfirm coor-
dination, creating board-friendship ties to rivals. We develop an original theoretical framework that
addresses the antecedents, maintenance, and consequences of board-friendship ties. The first compo-
nent of our framework explains why firms form and maintain these ties, where maintenance involves
the reconstitution of broken ties. The second component of our framework addresses how firms form
and maintain board-friendship ties. In particular, we explain the key role of executive search firms in
identifying the friends of rivals' CEOs. Our theoretical argument suggests that search firms' expertise
in eliciting sensitive information about external candidates for leadership positions makes them vital
intermediaries in forming and maintaining these ties. The third component of our framework
addresses the consequences of board-friendship ties for firm performance. Using large-scale, longitu-
dinal survey data combined with archival data, we test our hypotheses on a large sample of
U.S. firms, and find substantial support for our predictions.
This study contributes to the literature on boards of directors and corporate governance by identi-
fying an unregulated type of board tie that has the potential to reduce rivalry, and explaining the
mechanisms that underlie their formation, maintenance, and performance consequences. Although
there is a widespread belief among researchers and policymakers that board ties among rivals are rare
and do not facilitate collusion (see review by Mizruchi, 1996), our study explains how firms may
reduce competition by appointing the friends of rivals' CEOs to their boards, leading to better finan-
cial performance. Prior research suggests that friendship ties among CEOs of competing firms can
facilitate collusion (Westphal et al., 2006). Yet, evidence shows that friendship ties among CEOs of
competing firms are increasingly rare (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014; Park & Westphal, 2013).
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The sociological and social psychological literature on friendship indicates that genuine friendship
ties normally require considerable time, effort, and attention to develop and maintain (Page-Gould,
Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008; Swart, Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2011). In the present study, we
explain how firms avoid these problems by appointing the friends of competitors' CEOs to the board,
leveraging friendship ties that already exist. Our theory explains why appointing directors with
friendship ties to competitors can facilitate interfirm communication that reduces rivalry. Thus, our
study makes an important contribution to the corporate governance and strategic management litera-
tures by explaining how corporate directors can facilitate interfirm collusion. The findings also have
important public policy implications. In revealing how firms circumvent regulation by creating board
ties to the friends of rivals' CEOs, our study uncovers a widely used type of board tie that calls for
attention from antitrust regulators, as well as corporate governance scholars.
Our theory regarding the role of search firms in forming and maintaining board-friendship ties
makes additional contributions to the corporate governance literature. Scholars have devoted very lit-
tle systematic attention to understanding the role of consultants in the various processes of corporate
governance, including director selection. There is also little systematic research into how consultants
may reduce competition or help firms circumvent regulation. Our theory explains why search consul-
tants play a vital role in identifying director candidates who are friends of competitors' CEOs. By
explaining how board-friendship ties may facilitate collusive behavior, and then describing how
search firms broker the formation and maintenance of these ties, our study ultimately suggests how
consultants mediate the director selection process in ways that circumvent regulation of board ties
and could facilitate collusion. Moreover, in revealing how consultants broker interfirm ties that would
be viewed as illegitimate or illicit by some corporate stakeholders (e.g., customers), our study also
contributes to the social network literature. While the role of third parties in brokering illicit or illegit-
imate ties has been identified as an important research topic in the network literature (Bonacich,
1973), very little theory or research has revealed such a role for third-party actors in business
organizations.
1 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
1.1 | Reducing competition through board-friendship ties to rivals' CEOs
In this section, we explain why firms form board-friendship ties to rivals, and why they tend to
rebuild such ties when broken. We suggest that board-friendship ties to competitors may help firms
manage competitive uncertainty by facilitating interfirm cooperation that reduces the likelihood of
destructive competition between firms, while also providing a source of competitive advantage rela-
tive to firms that lack such ties.
We begin by explaining why board-friendship ties have the potential to facilitate interfirm coop-
eration. First, an outside director who is a friend of a rival's CEO is in a position to help assure the
rival of the firm's cooperation. Research on boards suggests that outside directors are increasingly
involved with firms' major strategic decisions, and hence are well exposed to firms' strategic plans
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). An outside director who is a
friend of a rival's CEO is thus able to inform the rival's CEO about the firm's future plans because of
the director's role in overseeing these decisions. The friendship between the director and the rival's
CEO further renders the CEO more willing to trust information from the director about the firm's
plans for interfirm cooperation. Research on friendship suggests that it typically implies trust and cer-
tain social obligations to care for each other's welfare (Krackhardt, 1992; Segal, 1979), including in
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the context of CEO-director relations (Westphal, 1999). The rival's CEO is thus likely to trust that the
director friend will provide accurate information about the firm's plans and facilitate interfirm cooper-
ation. In addition, the rival's CEO can expect that the director friend will ensure cooperation from the
firm because of the director's formal authority in supervising the firm's decisions. In contrast, a friend
of a rival's CEO who is not a director on the firm's board would not have the same access to informa-
tion about the firm's future strategic plans or routinely receive updates about the implementation of
these plans; an outside director of the firm who is not a friend of a rival's CEO may not be trusted by
the CEO, and hence fail to convince the rival's CEO to cooperate with the firm.
At the same time, an outside director who is a friend of a rival's CEO can help assure the firm of
the rival's cooperation. Research on CEO-board relations suggests that CEOs typically consider a
large proportion of their companies' directors as friends or as supporters of their leadership (Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999). Directors who appointed the CEO tend to support the CEO's leader-
ship from the beginning of their relationship (Khurana, 2002), and directors who were appointed
under the CEO's influence tend to feel socially obligated to return the CEO's favor by supporting the
CEO's leadership in subsequent interactions (Boeker, 1992; Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990;
Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Moreover, a director who helps a competitor at the
firm's expense may experience “social distancing” from fellow directors, as well as a significant loss
in their social capital and reputation within the broader director labor market (Westphal & Khanna,
2003). Westphal and colleagues have shown that directors who violate normative expectations on a
particular board not only tend to experience social distancing on that board, but also on other boards
where they serve as director, and they are much less likely to receive future board appointments
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Westphal & Stern, 2007).1 This research indicates that social distancing
is very effective at deterring directors from violating normative expectations on the boards where
they serve.
In addition, outside directors who are friends of competitors' CEOs can be expected to comply
with the confidentiality policy of the firm (i.e., they would face litigation risk by sharing sensitive
information with CEOs of competitors without the firm's consent). Thus, an outside director who is a
friend of a rival CEO has both intrinsic and extrinsic motives not to benefit a rival at the focal CEO's
expense, and is therefore likely to be trusted by the focal CEO to facilitate interfirm cooperation in a
fair manner. The focal CEO's trust in a director who is a friend of a rival's CEO can increase the
CEO's willingness to make policy decisions that assume cooperation by the director's friend (i.e., a
rival's CEO) and to trust that information provided to the director will not be exploited by the rival at
the focal firm's expense. In addition, the friendship between the director and a rival's CEO implies
that the rival's CEO has social obligations to care for the director's welfare (Krackhardt, 1992; Segal,
1979; Westphal, 1999), helping the director gain access to accurate and specific information about
the rival's strategic plans.
Because both the focal CEO and the rival's CEO can trust the director, the director can facilitate
the mutual exchange of sensitive information between the two firms. This increases the likelihood of
successful collusion, and in particular may reduce the misinterpretation of policy signals that could
lead to destructive competition. Research on interfirm rivalry suggests that misinterpreting policy sig-
nals is a major reason for breakdowns in cooperation (Utton, 2011). For example, in deciding
whether to expand production capacities, there is the risk that two firms may both try to preempt one
1These relationships held for directors who had average levels of status in the corporate elite (Westphal & Khanna, 2003), and are espe-
cially strong for directors with relatively low status; as discussed below, on average directors who form board-friendship ties tend to
rank relatively low in comparison to other directors on at least some indicators of status in the corporate elite, including prestige of the
director's primary employer and educational background.
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another. Without effective communications, either or both firms may misread the other's intentions
and move to expand capacities, leading to overcapacity that hurts both companies (Porter, 1980;
Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). When the firm's director is a friend of a rival's CEO, however, both com-
panies can exchange information through the director about their contingent decisions (e.g., their
intention not to increase capacity if the rival does not increase capacity) (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991)
and avoid such misinterpretations, which can lead to more reliable cooperation between the firms.
In addition, board-friendship ties can be a source of competitive advantage over firms that lack
such ties. Competitive advantage from these ties can take a relatively active form and a more passive
form. The active form can derive from coordinated attacks by the connected firms against their com-
mon competitors, or coordinated responses to these competitors' moves to defend their positions bet-
ter. For example, firms may jointly launch new products, advertising campaigns, promotions, or
other moves that exploit weaknesses in a competitor's position, and/or initiate such attacks when the
competitor is vulnerable (e.g., during a period of financial stress, change in leadership, or brand repo-
sitioning) (D'Aveni, 1994; Porter, 1980). The more passive form of competitive advantage from
board-friendship ties derives from the tendency for competitors to avoid taking actions that would
harm tied to firms or interfere with their plans, while giving less consideration to the adverse impact
of their actions on firms to which they lack ties. For example, competitors may avoid introducing
new products, advertising campaigns, or other strategic moves at a time that preempts a tied to firm's
new product launch or brand repositioning, but not take such precautions for firms to which they
lack ties.
Finally, although an outside director might have concerns about violating antitrust regulations by
potentially facilitating interfirm collusion, the friendship ties that we examine here are below the
radar of authorities, who typically focus on firm-level and industry-level characteristics that can be
measured with public data (e.g., board interlocks and industry concentration) or public signals of col-
lusion attempts (Crane, 2011). The friendship tie between an outside director and a rival's CEO is
largely private information and cannot be observed from public documents, making it very difficult
to detect the existence of such ties. In addition, interfirm communications through such an outside
director are likely to occur informally between the director and the two involved CEOs, making such
communications extremely difficult to detect. Our interviews with directors also confirm our expecta-
tion that directors are not particularly concerned about the risk of violating antitrust regulations when
they facilitate communications between competing firms.
While appointing friends of rivals' CEOs can reduce competition, research suggests that the bene-
fit of interfirm cooperation often depends on the level of competitive uncertainty in an industry. Com-
petitive uncertainty is higher to the extent that top executives have difficulty reliably predicting or
anticipating the actions of competitors or the consequences of these actions (i.e., in the absence of
communication) (Soda & Usai, 1999; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). Similarly, competitive uncertainty
arises from difficulties in inferring the intentions or plans of competitors from their actions alone
(Porter, 1980). Moreover, the degree of competitive uncertainty in an industry is influenced by the
level of market concentration. Competitive uncertainty tends to be low when there is a large number
of similar firms or a very small number of dominating firms (Burt, 1982; Palmer, Barber, Zhou, &
Soysal, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Westphal et al., 2006). In the former case, the highly com-
petitive environment reduces the likelihood that cooperation among a small number of firms would
meaningfully influence the market outcome, reducing competitive uncertainty. In the latter case, the
very small number of dominating firms can more easily infer each other's strategic intentions based
on actions (Sugaya & Takahashi, 2013). This not only reduces the likelihood of destructive competi-
tion but also makes tacit cooperation more feasible (Awaya & Krishna, 2014; Harrington, 2005),
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reducing the importance of interfirm communications through board-friendship ties. Conversely, high
competitive uncertainty in an industry is typically associated with an intermediate level of market
concentration. In such a market, collusion without direct communications is difficult, but cooperation
between firms can significantly influence market outcomes, increasing the value of communication
through board-friendship ties in order to manage competitive uncertainty.
Research on director appointments suggests that firms often appoint directors to their boards to
gain access to important resources or information (Hillman et al., 2009; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Our theory suggests that the appointments of outside directors who are
friends of rival firms' CEOs help the firm manage competitive uncertainty by gaining access to
important information about rival firms and achieve effective interfirm cooperation, which reduces
the likelihood of destructive competition and provides a source of competitive advantage relative to
firms that lack such ties.2 We therefore expect that the level of competitive uncertainty faced by a
firm will be positively associated with the formation of board-friendship ties to its rivals.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) There will be a positive association between the level of competitive
uncertainty faced by a firm and the formation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of the
firm's competitors.
1.1.1 | Rebuilding broken ties
Expectancy perspectives on social networks indicate that the expected utility of social network ties
affects the likelihood of both forming and maintaining such ties (Monge & Contractor, 2003; West-
phal & Deephouse, 2011), where the maintenance of network ties includes the reconstitution of ties
that are accidentally broken (Westphal et al., 2006). Our theoretical argument has suggested that
board-friendship ties to competitors may help firms manage competitive uncertainty by facilitating
interfirm cooperation that reduces the likelihood of destructive competition, while also providing a
competitive advantage relative to firms that lack such ties. We therefore expect that firms are espe-
cially likely to reconstitute broken board-friendship ties to the extent that they face relatively high
levels of competitive uncertainty. The focal firm A's board-friendship tie to firm B can be broken
either when firm B changes its CEO or in less common cases when the outside director who is a
friend of firm B's CEO departs from the focal board. Regardless of the specific reasons for the disso-
lution of a board-friendship tie, we expect that the firm will make efforts to rebuild the broken tie in
order to manage competitive uncertainty. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 (H2) There will be a positive association between the level of competitive
uncertainty faced by a firm and the likelihood that a broken board-friendship tie to the
CEO of the firm's competitor will be reconstituted.
1.2 | The mediating role of executive search firms
The process of identifying director candidates who are friends with competitors' CEOs can be com-
plex and delicate. As discussed above, the friendship ties between other firms' CEOs and potential
director candidates are not public information, and the focal board of directors may not feel comfort-
able approaching the CEOs of other firms for such private information. Executive search firms, how-
ever, are well suited to mediate this process (Khurana, 2002). According to a recent report by The
2Competitive uncertainty and competitive intensity are related but distinct constructs (Ang, 2008). Competitive intensity refers vari-
ously to the level or strength of competition, as opposed to the predictability of competition. Although competitive intensity is associ-
ated with uncertainty, at very high levels of intensity (e.g., under perfect competition), price is largely dictated by the market and
uncertainty is reduced.
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Association of Executive Search and Leadership Consultants (AESC, 2011), executive search firms
accounted for over 50% of the senior executive placements in the United States. However, there is
only limited research on the role of executive search firms in influencing the selection of firm leaders
(see review by Bonet, Cappelli, & Hamori, 2013). Among the limited number of studies, little has
been done to understand the influence of these headhunters on director selection or interfirm
collusion.
We suggest that executive search firms play a key role in identifying director candidates who
form board-friendship ties to the CEOs of competitors. Research on executive search firms suggests
that they often serve as matchmakers who collect information from both parties to ease executive
placements (Bidwell, 2011; Khurana, 2002). Khurana (2002) reported that search firms are especially
likely to be used for searches that involve sensitive selection criteria. This is in part because search
firms lend normative legitimacy to the selection process. Khurana (2002: 148) suggested that hiring a
professional headhunter creates the appearance of an objective and broad-based search for candidates,
while simultaneously enabling the board to “distance itself” from the search process. In particular, by
relying on the headhunter to identify director candidates who have desirable social connections, such
as friendship ties to the CEO of a competitor, the board distances itself from search criteria that, if
discovered, could be viewed as illegitimate by some firm stakeholders.
Given that friendship ties between firm leaders are often not visible to third parties, and external
perceptions of friendship can be unreliable (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), headhunters may need to solicit
information about such ties from the CEOs of a firm's competitors. In fact, the search consultants
whom we interviewed suggested that if they were searching for director candidates who have friend-
ship ties to a particular leader, they would approach the leader directly about possible candidates.
Consultants are vital intermediaries in the search process, because directors of the hiring firm would
be reluctant to approach the CEO of a competitor directly about possible board candidates, and
because headhunters at leading search firms are perceived to have particular expertise and experience
in the “delicate social process” of eliciting sensitive information about external candidates for leader-
ship positions (Khurana, 2002, p. 124).
Moreover, in conversing with the CEO of a competitor about possible board candidates, the con-
sultant can discretely signal the purpose of the appointment. As one CEO whom we interviewed sug-
gested, “if [a headhunter] asks you whether [a board candidate] is someone you know well and trust,
and says this is important, and you say yes they're a friend and I trust them and recommend them,
you're really saying ‘signal received’.” Such subtle exchanges are an example of what linguists call
“off-record indirect speech” (Lee & Pinker, 2010, p. 785), in which the speaker elicits information
and cooperation of a potentially illicit nature, without overtly describing the desired behavior
(e.g., exchange of strategic information), to maintain “plausible deniability” for both parties (Pinker,
Nowak, & Lee, 2008, p. 834). Our arguments above thus suggest that a headhunter's solicitation of
director candidates from a competitor's CEO will at least partially mediate the formation of board-
friendship ties, as well as the reconstitution of these ties when broken.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a) A headhunter's solicitation of director candidates from a compet-
itor's CEO will mediate the positive relationship between the level of competitive uncer-
tainty and the formation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of the firm's competitors.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b) A headhunter's solicitation of director candidates from a compet-
itor's CEO will mediate the positive relationship between the level of competitive uncer-
tainty and the likelihood that a broken board-friendship to the CEO of the competitor
will be reconstituted.
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1.3 | Performance effects of board-friendship ties to competitors
Industrial economics has long suggested that collusion helps firms enhance their profitability (Stigler,
1964). Theory and research on interfirm competition suggests that effective communications among
rivals about their contingent decisions can help reduce competition (Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Uzzi,
1997; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). When a firm's outside directors have friendship ties to some rivals,
such ties have the potential to effectively facilitate interfirm collusion and reduce competition with
them, resulting in better financial performance. In particular, when a firm is connected to some rivals
through board-friendship ties, they are in a position to share information about pricing, production,
and other strategic plans through such ties, and to obtain information about their rivals' plans, poten-
tially enabling them to better compete with other firms that lack such ties. In addition, a firm's board-
friendship ties to rivals may facilitate the mutual sharing of information about their common suppliers
and buyers, reducing information asymmetry and helping them negotiate better exchange terms than
competitors that do not have board-friendship ties.
Efforts to coordinate pricing and production levels through board-friendship ties are also more
likely to be successful due to the nature of such ties. As discussed above, any defection by the rival
CEO would damage the friendship relation, since it would put the director's social capital and reputa-
tion at risk, among fellow board members and within the broader director labor market (Westphal &
Khanna, 2003; Westphal & Stern, 2007). Similarly, the focal firm is unlikely to defect from an infor-
mal agreement or understanding reached through its outside director who is a friend of a rival's
CEO—any defections need to be first approved by or at least revealed to the outside director who
can be expected to object and then notify the rival's CEO. Moreover, directors' friendship ties to
rivals' CEOs can facilitate the mutual exchange of specific and fine-grained information (Uzzi, 1997)
about strategic plans more effectively than impersonal, public signaling of strategic plans between
firms. Public signaling is significantly constrained by antitrust concerns, such that firms must signal
their plans in vague terms that are easily missed or misinterpreted (Porter, 1980). As a result, the fre-
quency of public signaling of strategic plans is suppressed in most industries (Porter, 2005), and
when attempted, it is frequently unsuccessful in eliciting cooperation (Harrington, 2005). Friends of a
competitor CEO can send more specific, high-fidelity signals about the competitor's contingent plans
(e.g., “my understanding is that they will not cut price if we maintain ours,”) reducing the perceived
risk of cooperation.
To the extent that a firm can effectively coordinate its major decisions with competitors through
board-friendship ties to their CEOs, it can enjoy a higher degree of market power relative to con-
sumers and suppliers, leading to better financial performance. When a firm's outside directors have
friendship ties to the CEOs of the firm's competitors, the firm can better avoid or reduce destructive
competition, such as by decreasing the likelihood of price wars, avoiding bidding wars for supplies,
or cooperatively expanding production capacities when needed (Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Westphal
et al., 2006). Exchanging information with rivals about common suppliers and buyers may also per-
mit the firm to achieve better negotiation outcomes with these firms. Our theoretical argument has
also suggested that board-friendship ties provide a source of competitive advantage relative to firms
that lack such ties. The connected firms can engage in coordinated attacks against common competi-
tors, or coordinated responses to their competitors' moves (D'Aveni, 1994; Porter, 1980). Competitive
advantage from board-friendship ties may also take a more passive form, as firms avoid taking
actions that would disrupt the plans of tied to firms, and give little consideration to the adverse impact
of their actions on firms to which they lack ties. Thus, friendship ties between a firm's outside direc-
tors and CEOs of competitors may tend to facilitate mutual information sharing and coordination
with competitors that ultimately improves its financial performance.
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Hypothesis 4 (H4) Board-friendship ties to CEOs of the firm's competitors will be posi-
tively associated with the financial performance of the firm.
2 | METHOD
2.1 | Sample and data collection
The population for this study included large and medium-sized public companies in the United States
with more than $100 million in annual revenues. We measured board-friendship ties and several other
key constructs with survey responses from directors and CEOs. The sample frame for this survey
included outside directors at 900 firms in the population where at least one board member had
responded to a prior survey by the first author. Firms in the sample frame were representative of the
population with respect to each of the archival variables described below.
We took several measures to ensure the quality of the survey and boost participation rates, includ-
ing a qualitative pretest of the survey instrument that involved in-depth interviews with 26 current or
former directors from firms in the population (see Appendix). We measured friendship ties using
responses of directors who serve on the board's nominating committee, since our interviews sug-
gested that these directors tend to be especially knowledgeable about the friendship ties of fellow
board members to leaders of other firms (we provide further evidence for this assumption below).
Firms were included in the final sample if at least two members of the nominating committee agreed
to participate in the study, which involved responding to surveys annually from 2007 to 2013. We
required participation from at least two members of the nominating committee in order to assess the
inter-rater reliability of our survey measures. This resulted in an initial sample of 552 firms. If a direc-
tor stopped participating during the study (e.g., due to turnover), we sought the participation of other
committee members. Forty-three firms were dropped from the sample due to inadequate participation
during the study period, leaving a final sample of 509 firms (57% of the initial sample frame).3 To
further assess inter-rater reliability, we also surveyed (a) other directors at firms in the sample and
(b) CEOs in the same industry as a participating firm who were perceived by members of the firm's
nominating committee to have a friendship tie to a director of the firm (39% response rate).
We tested for survey nonresponse bias using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov equality of distributions
test (Gibbons & Chakraborti, 2011). Results indicated that participating firms were not significantly
different from nonparticipants on any of the independent or dependent variables derived from archi-
val data sources (p values ranged from 0.22 to 0.81). Similarly, participating directors were not sig-
nificantly different from nonparticipants with respect to age, tenure, management experience, or
experience as a director (p values ranged from 0.37 to 0.64).
We obtained demographic and board membership data on CEOs and directors from multiple
sources, including BoardEx, Compact Disclosure, Capital IQ, Marquis' Who's Who, The Dun and
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management, The Social Register, proxy statements, and
annual reports. We obtained firm financial data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Archival data for the
measure of industry constraint were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Security ana-
lyst reports were obtained from Investex, supplemented by Zacks.
3We conducted separate analyses for the larger sample of firms in which at least one member of the nominating committee participated,
and the results were substantively unchanged from those presented below, with respect to the statistical significance and magnitude of
the hypothesized effects.
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2.2 | Measures
2.2.1 | Board-friendship ties
Consistent with much prior research on social networks, we measured friendship ties directly with
survey questions (Brass, 1984; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999). As noted
above, our preliminary interviews suggested that directors who serve on the board's nominating com-
mittee tend to be particularly knowledgeable about the friendship ties of fellow board members to
leaders of other firms.4 The survey prompted these directors to indicate friendships between each out-
side director on the board and each CEO of competitors, buyer firms, and supplier firms, with the
directors and firms listed by name.5
We conducted several analyses to assess the inter-rater agreement and convergent validity of this
measure. First, we compared the responses of nominating committee members at the same firm, which
showed a high rate of agreement between directors about whether other board members had friendship
ties to particular CEOs in the same industry (97%). In a second set of analyses, we compared the
responses of nominating committee members with (a) the responses of other participating directors (d1…
N) about whether the participating director d had friendship ties to particular CEOs in the industry and
(b) the responses of participating CEOs at other firms about whether they had friendship ties to directors
on the focal board. Both analyses showed a similarly high level of inter-rater agreement (96 and 95%,
respectively).6 There were also strong correlations between our primary measure of friendship, based on
the responses of nominating committee members, and the responses of CEOs and other directors to
5-point scales that gauge key features of friendship ties referenced in our theoretical argument (cf., Hays,
1985; Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997), including trust (“To what extent do you feel you can trust this per-
son?”), and willingness to disclose sensitive information (“To what extent do you feel comfortable dis-
closing sensitive information to this person?”) (correlations ranged from .74 to .87).7 These analyses
provide evidence for convergent validity, as well as inter-rater reliability of our primary measure.
In the main analyses, we measured the formation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors
as the number of outside directors appointed to the focal board during the subsequent year who were
friends with the CEO of a competitor.8 In separate analyses, we measured the formation of ties over
longer time periods (2 years or 3 years), and the hypothesized results were unchanged. A board-
friendship tie to the CEO of a competitor was coded as broken if an outside director was friends with
the CEO at time t−1, and there was turnover of the CEO and/or director during the subsequent
12 months (i.e., between time t−1 and time t). In the primary analyses, we measured reconstitution of
4Our interviews indicated that members of the nominating committee commonly exchange information about the ties of fellow board
members and board candidates to leaders of other firms during the director selection process, and that headhunters often seek and pro-
vide additional information on such ties to the committee. Moreover, knowledge of such ties accumulates over the course of multiple
searches and is passed on from experienced committee members and consultants to their less experienced colleagues.
5Consistent with longstanding approaches to measuring friendship ties in the social network literature (cf., Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999;
Krackhardt & Porter, 1985), respondents filled out a matrix with CEOs in the industry and some leaders outside the industry listed on
the vertical axis, and directors of the focal firm on the horizontal axis. Respondents were asked to indicate “whether each individual is
an acquaintance or a personal friend of [the director].”
6Inter-rater agreement was adequately high even in industries with relatively low concentration. For example, among firms in industries
that lie in the bottom quartile of industry concentration, the rate of agreement between nominating committee members and other par-
ticipating directors (d1…N) about whether the director d had friendship ties to particular CEOs in the industry was 92%; similarly, the
rate of agreement between committee members and participating CEOs at other firms about whether they had friendship ties to direc-
tors on the focal board was 91%.
7Our primary measure was also correlated with a 5-point scale that gauges the closeness of respondents' personal relationships (Swart
et al., 2011; Zeng & Xie, 2008) with CEOs at other firms (“To what extent do you feel close to this person?”).
8Moreover, in the main analyses, this measure is based on the survey responses of one nominating committee member, selected at ran-
dom. In separate analyses, we used the average number of ties reported by respondents, and the results were essentially identical, which
reflects the high inter-rater reliability reported above.
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broken ties over the subsequent year. That is, a broken board-friendship tie between an outside direc-
tor of the focal firm (F) and the CEO of a competitor firm (Alter) was coded as reconstituted if a new
outside director of F was friends with the CEO of Alter at time t + 1. Again, in separate analyses, we
measured reconstitution of broken ties over longer time periods (2 years or 3 years), and the hypothe-
sized results were unchanged. As noted above, in a large majority of cases, friendship ties between
outside directors and CEOs of competitors were broken due to turnover of the CEO (88%).
2.2.2 | Competitive uncertainty
We used multiple measures of competitive uncertainty. First, we used a multi-item survey scale that
directly measures competitive uncertainty as defined in our theoretical argument. As discussed above,
competitive uncertainty is relatively high to the degree that top executives have difficulty reliably
predicting or anticipating the actions of competitors or the consequences of these actions (i.e., in the
absence of communication with competitors) (Soda & Usai, 1999; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). Simi-
larly, competitive uncertainty derives from difficulties in inferring the intentions or plans of competi-
tors from their actions alone (Porter, 1980). The survey scale items are listed in the Appendix, and
they directly reflect our theoretical conceptualization of competitive uncertainty (e.g., “How predict-
able would the actions of competitors be, in the absence of measures to reduce the uncertain-
ty?”…“To what extent would it be difficult to anticipate the actions of competitors, without strategies
to reduce the uncertainty?”…“To what extent would it be difficult to infer the intentions or plans of
competitors from their actions alone?”). Inter-item reliability of the scale was acceptably high
(α = 0.92). There was also a high level of inter-rater agreement between respondents at the same
firm: Weighted Kappa coefficients for the survey items ranged from 0.83 to 0.89 (Fleiss, 1981). We
developed this measure for each company in the sample in each year of the study.
We developed a second measure of competitive uncertainty by conducting a text analysis of secu-
rity analyst reports for companies in the sample frame in each year of the study. We screened for sen-
tences in the reports that referred to competitive uncertainty using a dictionary of synonymous words
and phrases (available from the authors on request). We then had two coders read all reports that con-
tained at least one reference to competitive uncertainty as identified in the text analysis, and assess
whether the report indicated that the firm faced (a) a low level of competitive uncertainty, (b) some
competitive uncertainty, or (c) a high level of competitive uncertainty, as defined in our theoretical
argument.9 There was a high rate of agreement between the coders about the level of uncertainty
(84%) described in the reports, and a very high level of agreement about whether the reports indicated
that the focal firm faced at least some competitive uncertainty (95%). For our primary analyses, we
then calculated the percentage of analyst reports in each year which suggested that the focal firm
faced at least some competitive uncertainty. In separate analyses, we restricted this measure to cases
in which both coders agreed that the report suggested high competitive uncertainty, and the hypothe-
sized results were unchanged.
As our third measure of competitive uncertainty, we used the mean-deviated concentration level
of the focal firm's primary industry, following a long line of prior research (Burt, 1983; Palmer et al.,
1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Westphal et al., 2006). As discussed above, these prior studies sug-
gest that competitive uncertainty tends to be relatively high in industries with an intermediate level of
market concentration. We first calculated the absolute value of the difference between the four-firm
9We followed procedures that are believed to provide a more meaningful assessment of intercoder reliability (Holsti, 1968; Weber,
1985). The coders had different backgrounds: One was an MBA student with a background in Finance, and the other was an under-
graduate business student with a focus on marketing; neither was a coauthor on the paper. The coders were provided with the descrip-
tion of competitive uncertainty from our theoretical argument, but were not provided with a detailed coding guide or coaching that
could inflate estimates of reliability.
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concentration ratio of the focal firm's primary industry (i.e., the total market share of the four largest
firms) and the mean concentration ratio for all industries represented in the sample frame (Burt,
1983; Palmer et al., 1995; Westphal et al., 2006). This variable was then inverted so that higher
values correspond to medium levels of industry concentration (indicating higher levels of competitive
uncertainty).
Factor analysis showed that all of these measures—the survey scale, the measure derived from
content analysis, and the measure of market concentration—loaded on the same factor as expected,
with factor loadings above .6 for each of the measures. We estimated factor scores using the regres-
sion method (the hypothesized results were unchanged using the Bartlett method). As discussed
below, in further analyses, we used each of the three measures in separate models, and again the
results were unchanged (as would be expected from the high factor loadings of the measures).
2.2.3 | Headhunter's solicitation of director candidates
We used a series of survey questions to determine whether a headhunter solicited director candidates
from a competitor's CEO. One question asked nominating committee members, “From whom did
[the headhunter] solicit candidates for a position on the board during the previous twelve months [list
positions or names]?” Another question asked, “Approximately when did [the headhunter] solicit
candidates from this person?” A parallel set of questions was included in the CEO survey to assess
inter-rater reliability. There was a high level of agreement between respondents at the same firm
about whether the focal firm's headhunter solicited director candidates from a competitor's CEO
(95%). For cases of broken ties, there was a similarly high level of agreement between nominating
committee members and Alter's CEO about whether the focal firm's headhunter solicited the CEO for
board candidates on behalf of the focal firm (95%). To test H3a regarding the mediating role of head-
hunters in tie formation, we created a dichotomous variable coded “1” if responding directors indi-
cated that the focal firm's headhunter solicited the CEO of a competitor for board candidates on
behalf of the focal firm during the current year. To test H3b regarding the mediating role of head-
hunters in tie reconstitution, we created a dichotomous variable coded “1” if responding directors
indicated that the focal firm's headhunter solicited the CEO of Alter for board candidates on behalf of
the focal firm during the year after a board-friendship tie to Alter was broken.
2.2.4 | Firm performance
In the primary analyses, we measured the focal firm's financial performance as industry-adjusted
return on assets (ROA) in year t + 1. In separate models, we used industry-adjusted return on equity
(ROE) and Tobin's q as alternative measures of firm performance, and the hypothesized results were
unchanged. The results were unchanged when the performance measures were not adjusted for indus-
try, and the results were also robust to estimating ROA, ROE, or Tobin's q in year t + 2 or t + 3.
Given potential concerns with ratio-based measures (Wiseman, 2009), we ran separate models that
estimate net income while controlling for total assets. The hypothesized results were unchanged, and
are reported separately below.
2.2.5 | Control variables
Given that poor firm performance could motivate the appointment of directors who have friendship
ties to competitors, we controlled for recent firm performance in models of board-friendship ties,
measured as ROA in year t−1. We also controlled for firm size, measured as the logged value of total
sales in year t−1 (Crossland & Chen, 2013). In addition, we controlled for other kinds of ties between
firms. We controlled for common board appointments between directors of the focal firm and CEOs
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of competitors. Although such ties are less common and much weaker than board-friendship ties, and
are unlikely to substitute for such ties, they could be used to identify director candidates who are
friends of the CEO. Given some evidence that board ties are correlated with other formal ties between
firms, such as joint ventures, interfirm stockholding, or common ownership (Palmer et al., 1986), we
included a dichotomous control that indicates whether such relationships existed between the focal
firm and competitors. In other analyses, we included a separate control for common ownership, and
the results were unchanged. We also controlled for board size in models of board-friendship ties. In
estimating the reconstitution of broken ties, we included a dichotomous variable that indicates
whether ties were broken due to CEO or director turnover. Moreover, we controlled for the focal
firm's dependence on resource providers, using the measure developed and validated by Westphal
et al. (2006) (see Appendix for a complete description of this measure). In separate analyses, we used
Burt's (1983) measure of industry constraint, and the hypothesized results were unchanged.
Although our theory focuses on board-friendship ties that are created through appointments to the
focal firm's board, as these ties are more under the focal firm's control, our theory would also imply
that the focal firm is likely to benefit when the CEO's friends serve on the boards of competitors.
Thus, in models of firm performance, we controlled for the number of friends of the focal CEO who
serve on the boards of competitors. We also controlled for the number of board-friendship ties to
CEOs of resource providers, as well as the number of friends of the focal CEO who serve on the
boards of resource providers.
We controlled for key indicators of resource allocation in models of performance (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990), including the advertising
ratio (advertising/sales), the research and development (R&D) ratio (R&D/sales), financial leverage
(debt/equity), and capital expenditure (as a percentage of sales) in year t−1; the hypothesized results
were also robust to controlling for the liquidity ratio. We controlled for the log of sales in year t−1,
and in random effects models, we included a dichotomous control for whether the focal firm operates
in only one industry. We controlled for survey measures of friendship ties between the focal firm's
CEO and the CEOs of competitors and resource providers that parallel our measures of board-
friendship ties. There was high agreement between directors on the nominating committee and CEOs
themselves about the CEO's friendship ties to leaders of other firms (94%). We also included both
year and industry dummy variables (using two-digit SIC codes) in all models. In separate models, we
controlled for industry-adjusted ROA in the prior year, and the hypothesized results were unchanged.
2.3 | Analysis
We used panel data to test the effects of competitive uncertainty on the formation of board-friendship
ties. As noted above, the primary dependent variable for H1 is the number of outside directors
appointed to the focal board during the subsequent year who were friends with the CEO of a competi-
tor. Thus, the unit of analysis in tests of H1 is the firm-year (N = 3,054). Since we use panel data and
the dependent variable is a count without overdispersion, we used random-effects poisson regression
analysis.10 The Hausman test indicated that there was not a systematic difference between the
random-effects and fixed-effects specifications. Thus, we used random effects in the primary models.
In separate models, we tested the hypotheses using GEE regression with clustered robust standard
errors, and the hypothesized results were unchanged from those presented below. In further analyses,
we estimated a Heckman poisson model (Terza, 1998) in which the selection equation estimates par-
ticipation in the study among the larger sample frame (see Appendix for a description of this model).
10The likelihood ratio test of overdisperson (α = 0) was not statistically significant (p = 0.491).
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None of the independent variables from the main equation were significant in the selection equation.
Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and Semadeni (2016) state that the independent variable of interest must be
a significant predictor in the selection equation for sample selection bias to exist. In any event, as dis-
cussed below, the hypothesized effect of competitive uncertainty on board-friendship ties remained
strongly significant in this model.
In the main analyses, we tested H2 regarding the reconstitution of broken board-friendship ties
for the subsample of ties to CEOs of competitors (N = 1,065) that were broken in the prior year. We
used logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. Again, in further analyses, we estimated a
Heckman probit model in which the selection equation estimates the likelihood of a broken tie among
the full sample of board-friendship ties (see Appendix). None of the independent variables from the
main equation were significant in the selection equation, which provides some indication that sample
selection bias is not affecting our results (Certo et al., 2016; Wooldridge, 2010). In any case, as dis-
cussed below, the effect of competitive uncertainty on the likelihood of reconstituting broken board-
friendship ties remained strongly significant in the model.
We tested the mediating effect of a headhunter's solicitation of director candidates from a compet-
itor's CEO using the product of coefficients method with Sobel–Goodman standard errors
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Although this method can be overly con-
servative with inflated type II errors, MacKinnon's simulations showed that such errors are small for
large samples. Nevertheless, we conducted separate analyses using the bootstrapping method with
bias-corrected estimates (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; also Preacher & Hayes, 2008),
based on 5,000 bootstrapped samples from the dataset. The hypothesized results were very similar to
those reported below.
We used fixed-effects regression analysis with clustered robust standard errors to test the hypoth-
esized effects of board-friendship ties on firm performance. The Durbin–Watson and Breusch–
Godfrey tests indicated that autocorrelation was not significant.
3 | RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are included in Table 1, and bivariate correlations are provided in Table 2. As
shown in Table 1, while the average number of board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors was
2.2, friendship ties between the focal firm's CEO and CEOs of competitors were comparatively rare
(mean of 0.66). Moreover, 68% of broken board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors were recon-
stituted. By comparison, Westphal et al.'s (2006) analysis showed that only 34% of broken friendship
ties between the focal firm's CEO and CEOs of competitors were reconstituted. As discussed above,
moreover, reconstitution of friendship ties between CEOs occurs over a much longer time span.
Westphal et al. (2006) measured reconstitution over a 3-year time window; very few broken ties were
repaired within 1 year. By contrast, board-friendship ties were reconstituted at a much higher rate
(a majority within 1 year).
Table 3 includes the results of poisson regression models of board-friendship ties to CEOs of
competitors. H1 predicted that the level of competitive uncertainty would be associated with the for-
mation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of the firm's competitors. The results provide support for this
hypothesis: there is a positive association between our measure of competitive uncertainty and the
subsequent formation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of the firm's competitors (p < 0.001). Sepa-
rate analysis also confirmed that the marginal effect of competitive uncertainty is statistically signifi-
cant over the full range of sampled observations; z-statistics of the marginal effects ranged from 9.61
to 16.70. The magnitude of the effect is also considerable. For example, all else equal, when
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competitive uncertainty is one standard deviation greater, the incidence rate ratio for the number of
board-friendship ties to competitors is approximately 2.5 times greater.
The results of logit regression models of the reconstitution of broken board-friendship ties are
provided in Table 4, and they provide support for H2. As shown in Model 1 of the table, there is a
positive relationship between competitive uncertainty and the likelihood of reconstituting a broken
board-friendship tie to the CEO of a competitor firm. Separate analysis confirmed that the marginal
effect of competitive uncertainty is statistically significant over the full range of sampled observa-
tions; z-statistics of the marginal effects ranged from 10.09 to 19.30.
The mediating effects of headhunter solicitation of director candidates are displayed in Table 5.
Consistent with H3a, the hypothesized relationship between competitive uncertainty and the subse-
quent formation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors is significantly mediated by head-
hunter solicitation of director candidates from a competitor's CEO (p < 0.001). H3b is also
supported: the relationship between competitive uncertainty and reconstitution of a broken board-
friendship tie to the CEO of a competitor is also significantly mediated by headhunter solicitation of
director candidates from the competitor's CEO (p < 0.001).
The results of fixed-effects regression models of firm performance are provided in Table 6, and
they provide support for the hypothesized effects of board-friendship ties on firm performance. Con-
sistent with H4, the results indicate a positive effect of friendship ties between a firm's outside direc-
tors and CEOs of the firm's competitors on firm profitability at p < 0.001. Moreover, the magnitude
of these effects is noteworthy. An increase of one board-friendship tie to competitors is associated
with an average increase in ROA of 1.6%, which corresponds to an average increase in net income of
approximately $134 million. As noted above, in light of potential concerns about ratio-based
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD
1. Competitive uncertainty 0.00a 0.98
2. Concentration of buyer/supplier industries 40.88 19.04
3. Perceived value of resources provided by exchange partners 0.00a 0.97
4. Return on assets (ROA) 0.04 0.08
5. Log of sales 7.44 1.66
6. Common board appointments between directors and chief executive officer (CEO) 1.37 2.09
7. Formal tie 0.37 0.48
8. CEO versus director turnover 0.88 0.33
9. Debt to equity ratio 1.86 10.06
10. Research and development (R&D) ratio 0.02 0.05
11. Advertising ratio 0.01 0.03
12. Capital expenditure 0.09 0.17
13. Friendship ties b/w CEO of focal firm and CEOs of competitors 0.66 0.85
14. Friendship ties b/w CEO of focal firm and CEOs of firms in buyer/supplier industries 0.98 0.96
15. Board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors 2.2 3.0
16. Focal CEO's friends on boards of competitors 2.2 3.1
17. Focal CEO's friends on boards of resource providers 2.6 3.9
18. Board size 9.79 3.39
19. Reconstitution of broken board-friendship tie to CEO of competitor 0.68 0.47
a Variables with a mean of zero are factor scores derived from factor analysis. Factor scores are a weighted sum of variables that com-
prise the measure, with the variable scores standardized and weighted by their factor loadings (Grice & Harris, 1998).
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measures, we ran a separate analysis that estimated the effect of board-friendship ties on net income,
controlling for firm assets. As reported in Table A1 of the Appendix, the hypothesized results were
fully consistent with the results for ROA.
TABLE 2 Pearson correlation coefficients
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Models of board-friendship ties (N = 3,054)
1. Competitive uncertainty
2. Concentration of buyer/supplier industries .02
3. Perceived value of resources provided by exchange
partners
.03 −.01
4. Return on assets (ROA) −.07 −.18 .05
5. Log of sales −.02 −.04 −.01 .04
6. Common board appointments between directors and
chief executive officers (CEOs)
.02 −.03 .01 .04 .02
7. Formal ties .05 .08 .07 .02 .03 .03
8. Board size −.03 −.01 −.02 .03 .14 .12 .10
9. Board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors .3234 .22 .05 −.12 .09 .02 −.08 .10
Models of reconstitution of broken board-friendship ties
(N = 1,065)
1. Competitive uncertainty
2. Concentration of buyer/supplier industries .02
3. Perceived value of resources provided by exchange
partners
.03 −.01
4. ROA −.06 −.17 .05
5. Log of sales −.03 −.04 −.01 .04
6. Common board appointments between directors and
CEO of other firm
.03 −.02 .02 .03 .02
7. Formal tie to other firm .05 .09 .08 .01 .05 .04
8. CEO versus director turnover .054 .02 .00 −.01 .01 .00 .01
9. Board size −.02 −.01 −.02 .02 .12 .11 .10 −.05
10. Reconstitution of broken board-friendship tie to CEO
of competitor
.36 .18 .06 −.10 .06 .03 −.09 .04 .13
Models of firm performance (N = 3,054)
1. Board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors
2. Board-friendship ties to CEOs of firms in buyer/
supplier industries
.16
3. Log of sales .08 .07
4. Debt to equity ratio .02 .00 .06
5. Research and development (R&D) ratio −.08 −.06 −.04 .02
6. Advertising ratio −11 −.07 −.01 .02 .01
7. Capital expenditure −.06 −.05 .02 .03 −.02 −.04
8. Focal CEO's friends on boards of competitors .05 −.02 .06 −.01 −.04 −.09 −.04
9. Focal CEO's friends on boards of resource providers −.01 −.03 .06 −.02 −.02 −.03 −.02 .02
10. Friendship ties b/w CEO of focal firm and CEOs of
competitors
−.03 −.01 .03 .01 −.02 .03 .02 −.03 −.01
11. Friendship ties b/w CEO of focal firm and
CEOs of firms in buyer/supplier industries
−.01 −.04 .05 .02 −.01 .01 .02 .01 −.03 .10
12. Industry-adjusted ROA .32 .29 .06 .03 −.14 −.11 −.07 .26 .02 .05 .07
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TABLE 3 Poisson regression model of board-friendship ties to chief executive officers (CEOs) of competitorsa
Independent variable
1. Competitive uncertainty 0.397 [.000]
(0.027)




3. Concentration of buyer/supplier industries 0.003 [.038]
(0.002)
4. Perceived value of resources provided by exchange partners 0.039 [.188]
(0.029)
5. Return on assets (ROA) −1.478 [.001]
(0.463)
6. Log of sales 0.031 [.053]
(0.016)
7. Common board appointments between directors and CEOs 0.023 [.086]
(0.013)
8. Formal ties −0.011 [.013]
(0.004)






a p values are in brackets (two-tailed tests); standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included.
TABLE 4 Logit regression model of the reconstitution of broken board-friendship tiesa
Independent variable
1. Competitive uncertainty 1.187 [.000]
(0.082)
2. Resource dependence (concentration of buyer/supplier industry × perceived value of resources
provided by exchange partner) 0.012 [.018]
(0.005)
3. Concentration of buyer/supplier industries 0.010 [.026]
(0.004)
4. Perceived value of resources provided by exchange partners 0.121 [.176]
(0.089)
5. Return on assets (ROA) −2.279 [.032]
(1.064)
6. Log of sales 0.082 [.078]
(0.046)
7. Common board appointments between directors and chief executive officer (CEO) of other firm 0.059 [.133]
(0.039)
8. Formal tie to other firm −0.502 [.029]
(0.230)
9. CEO versus director turnover 0.387 [.094]
(0.231)






a p values are in brackets (two-tailed tests); standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included.
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To examine the potential for endogeneity in our models, we estimated impact threshold for a con-
founding variable (ITCV) scores for our independent variables of interest (Busenbark, Lange, &
Certo, 2017; Frank, 2000; Hubbard, Christensen, & Graffin, 2017; Oliver, Krause, Busenbark, &
Kalm, 2018), using the konfound command in Stata. The impact thresholds of the (hypothetical)
omitted variables were consistently greater than the impact of variables included in the models, pro-
viding some evidence that omitted variables are not a concern in our analyses.
3.1 | Supplemental analyses
Our theoretical argument would imply that board-friendship ties should partially mediate the rela-
tionship between competitive uncertainty and firm performance. We conducted a separate media-
tion analysis using the product of coefficients method with Sobel–Goodman standard errors
TABLE 5 Mediating effects of headhunter solicitation of director candidatesa
Mediated path z
Competitive uncertainty +! headhunter solicitation of director candidates from chief executive officer
(CEO) of a competitor +! formation of board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitorsb
0.036 [.000]
(0.003)
Competitive uncertainty +! headhunter solicitation of director candidates from CEO of other firm +! reconstitution
of broken board-friendship tie to CEO of competitorc
0.088 [.000]
(0.005)
a p values are in brackets (two-tailed tests); standard errors are in parentheses.
b N = 3,054.
c N = 1,065.
TABLE 6 Fixed-effects regression analysis of firm performancea
Independent variable
1. Board-friendship ties to chief executive officers (CEOs) of competitors 0.016 [.000]
(0.001)
2. Board-friendship ties to CEOs of firms in buyer/supplier industries 0.015 [.000]
(0.0008)
3. Friendship ties between CEO of focal firm and CEOs of competitors 0.005 [.057]
(0.003)
4. Friendship ties between CEO of focal firm and CEOs of firms in buyer/supplier industries 0.006 [.034]
(0.003)
5. Focal CEO's friends on boards of competitors 0.013 [.000]
(0.001)
6. Focal CEO's friends on boards of resource providers 0.0001 [.854]
(0.0007)
7. Log of sales 0.0018 [.252]
(0.0016)
8. Debt to equity ratio 0.0003 [.087]
(0.0002)
9. Research and development (R&D) ratio −0.228 [.003]
(0.077)
10. Advertising ratio −0.394 [.013]
(0.158)





a N = 3054. p values are in brackets (two-tailed tests); standard errors are in parentheses. Year dummies are included.
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(MacKinnon et al., 2002), which confirmed that board-friendship ties to competitors is a statisti-
cally significant, partial mediator of the relationship between competitive uncertainty and ROA
(p < 0.001).
We conducted supplemental analysis of the survey data to corroborate our theoretical argument
for the performance effects of board-friendship ties. Our argument suggested that board-friendship
ties to competitors' CEOs would enable a focal firm to coordinate with competitors to maintain rel-
atively high prices and otherwise favorable contract terms with buyers, and to negotiate favorable
terms with suppliers. The survey asked CEOs and directors at current or potential buyers of a focal
firm, “[over the past twelve months] To what extent has [the focal firm] seemed to be acting in con-
cert with competitors, with respect to (1) price (2) production?” “To what extent has [the focal
firm] been able to keep prices higher than might be expected, given economic conditions?” “To
what extent is it difficult to negotiate favorable terms with [the focal firm]?” “To what extent has
[the focal firm] been able to keep its terms with [buyers in respondent's industry], with respect to
price or value-added services, more favorable than might be expected, given economic condi-
tions?” The survey included a parallel set of questions for CEOs of current or potential supplier
firms. There was at least one response from the CEO of a buyer or supplier firm in each year of the
study period for 69% of firms in the sample frame (N = 351 firms; 2,106 firm years). Confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) showed that responses to the survey items loaded on one factor as expected,
with good interitem reliability (α = 0.91). There was also high inter-rater reliability for cases with
multiple respondents (Weighted Kappa = 0.86).
Further analysis indicated that the factor score for this measure mediated the hypothesized effect
of board-friendship ties to CEOs of competitors on firm performance in fixed-effects models of
industry-adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin's q (p < 0.001). These models included the full set of con-
trol variables in Table 6.11
Our theoretical argument also suggested that board-friendship ties can be a source of competitive
advantage over firms that lack such ties. To corroborate our argument, we surveyed a random sample of
300 directors from firms with at least one board-friendship tie who participated in the study. The response
rate was 45% (N = 136). The firms at which these directors served were not significantly different from
the firms of nonrespondents with respect to the level of competitive uncertainty and measures of firm per-
formance. We asked the directors to what extent they would agree that firms can derive a competitive
advantage from having an outside director on the board who is a friend of a competitor's CEO [5-point
Likert-type scale: strongly disagree…disagree…neither agree nor disagree...agree…strongly agree]. One
hundred and thirty-two directors agreed or strongly agreed with this statement (97%).
Moreover, this survey also included a series of questions about the specific forms of competitive
advantage cited in our argument: “[Board-friendship ties] can facilitate coordinated attacks by connected
firms against their common competitors” [5-point Likert-type scale: strongly disagree…disagree…nei-
ther agree nor disagree…agree…strongly agree]; “[Board-friendship ties] can help connected firms
defend their positions against the strategic moves of their common competitors” [5-point Likert-type
scale]; “A firm may avoid taking actions that would harm a competitor [to which they are connected by
a board-friendship tie], but give less consideration to the adverse effect of their actions on other firms
[to which they lack ties]” [5-point Likert-type scale]. Ninety-six percent of responding directors agreed
or strongly agreed with the first two questions, and 94% agreed or strongly agreed with the third
11As discussed above, while our hypotheses focus on board-friendship ties that result from appointments to the focal firm's board
(i.e., since these ties are more under the focal firm's control), our theory would also imply that the focal firm has the potential to realize
coordination benefits when the focal CEO's friends serve on the boards of competitor firms. In fact, as shown in Table 6, there is a
strong, positive relationship between the number of friends of the focal CEO who serve on the boards of competitors and subsequent
firm performance.
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question. Overall, this survey data provides supplemental evidence suggesting that directors tend to per-
ceive that board-friendship ties can provide a source of competitive advantage over firms that lack such
ties, and it corroborates the specific mechanisms described in our theoretical argument.12
Our theoretical argument suggested that an outside director who is a friend of a rival CEO has both
intrinsic and extrinsic motives not to benefit a rival at the focal CEO's expense. We cited evidence that
directors who are appointed under the CEO's influence tend to feel socially obligated to return the favor
by supporting the CEO's leadership in subsequent interaction (Boeker, 1992; Wade et al., 1990; West-
phal, 1999; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). We also cited evidence that directors who violate normative
expectations on a particular board tend to experience social distancing from fellow directors, not only
on that board, but also on other boards where they serve as director, and they are much less likely to
receive future board appointments (Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Westphal & Stern, 2007). As described
in the Appendix, moreover, we collected survey evidence that further corroborates our argument.
Empirical evidence that firms tend to reconstitute broken board-friendship ties, and evidence regarding
the strong performance effects of these ties, provide further support for our theory.
4 | DISCUSSION
Our theory and supportive findings challenge the widespread assumption that board ties no longer help
firms reduce competition (Buch-Hansen, 2014; Mizruchi, 1996). Our first set of results show that the
level of competitive uncertainty faced by a firm is significantly and positively related to the formation of
friendship ties between a firm's outside directors and rivals' CEOs. Additional results suggest that firms
were more likely to reconstitute broken board-friendship ties to the extent that they face relatively high
levels of competitive uncertainty. These findings are consistent with our theoretical expectation that firms
seek to manage competitive uncertainty by creating and maintaining board-friendship ties to rivals. Our
second set of results addressed how firms form and maintain board-friendship ties. In particular, we
found considerable evidence that executive search firms mediated the formation and maintenance of
these ties. A headhunter's solicitation of director candidates from a competitor's CEO mediated the rela-
tionship between competitive uncertainty and the formation of board-friendship ties to competitors, and
such solicitation also mediated the effect of competitive uncertainty on the reconstitution of broken ties.
Additional results provided evidence that board-friendship ties to rivals are associated with higher
subsequent firm performance. In particular, an additional board-friendship tie to competitors improved
a firm's net income by approximately $134 million on average. Supplemental evidence provided further
support for our theoretical argument regarding the mechanisms by which board-friendship ties to rivals
increase firm performance. In particular, analysis of our survey data corroborated our theoretical argu-
ment that board-friendship ties facilitate interfirm coordination that enables firms to reduce competition
on price and other contract terms. Survey data also corroborated our argument that board-friendship ties
can provide a source of competitive advantage over firms that lack these ties, including supplemental
evidence for the specific mechanisms of competitive advantage described in our theory. Taken together,
our findings provided strong support for our theoretical expectations about the antecedents, mainte-
nance, and performance consequences of board-friendship ties to competitors.
12Our interviews also suggested specific ways in which firms that are connected by board-friendship ties can achieve a competitive
advantage over firms that lack these ties, and these are reflected in our theoretical argument. For example, a number of directors whom
we interviewed mentioned that connected firms may jointly launch new products, advertising campaigns, or promotions that exploit
weaknesses in a competitor's position, or initiate such moves when a competitor is vulnerable (e.g., during a period of financial stress,
leadership change, brand repositioning, or other strategic changes).
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This study makes multiple important contributions to the literature on boards of directors and
corporate governance. Although board interlock ties have the potential to reduce competition
(Buch-Hansen, 2014; Mizruchi, 1996), such ties have become impractical as a means of managing
competitive uncertainty. As discussed above, board interlock ties to competitors can violate anti-
trust laws, and widespread concerns about “over-boarded” executives have made it more difficult
to maintain ties in which the CEO of one firm serves on another firm's board (Buch-Hansen, 2014;
Harris & Shimizu, 2004). As a result, board interlock ties between competitors are uncommon, and
rarely reconstituted when broken, leading to the widespread assumption among scholars and regu-
lators that board ties no longer help firms reduce competition (Mizruchi, 2013). Our study repre-
sents a significant challenge to this assumption. Our theory and supportive findings reveal how
firms have been able to circumvent the regulatory and other constraints on board ties by appointing
the friends of rival CEOs to their boards. Our theoretical argument explains the specific mecha-
nisms that underlie the formation and maintenance of board-friendship ties, and explains how these
ties may enhance firm performance by facilitating interfirm coordination that reduces rivalry. By
extension, our study contributes to the corporate governance and strategic management literatures
by explaining how corporate directors may facilitate interfirm collusion.
Our theory and findings regarding the role of search firms in brokering the formation and mainte-
nance of board-friendship ties make additional important contributions to the corporate governance lit-
erature. There is very little systematic research on how consultants influence the various processes and
practices of corporate governance, including director selection. There is also little if any systematic
inquiry into how consultants may dampen competition or help firms circumvent regulation. In explain-
ing how search firms broker board-friendship ties by identifying director candidates who are friends of
competitors' CEOs, and then revealing how board-friendship ties may enable interfirm coordination that
reduces competition, our study reveals how consultants mediate director selection in ways that circum-
vent regulation of board ties and may facilitate interfirm collusion.
At the same time, our study makes a broader contribution to the social network literature. Our
findings suggest that search firms broker social network ties that would be considered illicit or illegit-
imate by some corporate stakeholders, including customers. The role of third parties in brokering
illicit or illegitimate ties has been long been recognized as an important lacuna in the social network
literature (Bonacich, 1973); to date, very little research has revealed such roles for third-party actors
in business organizations.
Moreover, in light of prior research on the rarity of board interlock ties between competitors, our
study suggests a kind of decoupling between appearances and reality with respect to social connections
between the leaders of competing firms. While the rarity of board interlocks between competitors is
taken to indicate the absence of communication between competitors' CEOs (Mizruchi, 1996, 2013),
the absence of interlock ties often belies the presence of board-friendship ties. Moreover, search consul-
tants exacerbate the decoupling; while consultants are known to enhance the legitimacy of executive
search processes, in part by providing an ostensibly independent perspective on search criteria and
potential candidates (Khurana, 2002), our study suggests that they ironically broker social ties between
leaders that would be viewed as illegitimate by some firm stakeholders. In this way, search consultants
facilitate decoupling, not only between appearances and reality in director selection, but also between
the apparent functioning of corporate directors and their actual role in strategic management.
Our theory described the subtle and delicate communication process by which headhunters broker
board-friendship ties. We described how headhunters, in speaking with the CEO of a competitor about
possible board candidates, can discretely signal the purpose of the appointment. We drew from psycho-
linguistic theory in characterizing these communications as a kind of “off-record indirect speech” in
WESTPHAL AND ZHU 99
which the headhunter solicits information and cooperation of a potentially illicit nature, without overtly
describing the desired behavior (e.g., the exchange of strategic information) (Lee & Pinker, 2010,
p. 785). Such communication is thought to maintain the “plausible deniability” of both parties (Pinker
et al., 2008, p. 834). Our study suggests that there is promise in drawing from linguistic theory to
explain the role of search consultants and other information brokers in business organizations. Although
our findings indicate that headhunters were often successful in soliciting board candidates who form or
reconstitute board-friendship ties, the solicitation of director candidates from a competitor's CEO does
not always yield viable candidates. There would be value in further qualitative and survey research that
examines the specific characteristics of communications by headhunters that are relatively successful or
unsuccessful in eliciting sensitive information about board candidates.
Our study has limitations, which also suggest opportunities for future research. While our supple-
mental survey data from corporate directors and from CEOs and directors of buyer and supplier firms
provided some indirect, corroborating evidence that board-friendship ties may enhance profitability by
facilitating coordination between competitors, there would clearly be value in future research that pro-
vides behavioral evidence that such ties promote cooperation that reduces the likelihood of destructive
competition. For example, there would be value in studies that examine whether board-friendship ties
to competitors are associated with less aggressive price competition, and a lower incidence of bidding
wars for supplies. There would also be value in research that examines whether firms connected by
board-friendship ties are more likely to launch strategic moves jointly against a common competitor
that exploit weaknesses in the competitor's position, or to initiate such moves when the competitor is
vulnerable (e.g., jointly launching new products, advertising campaigns, promotions, or other moves
when the competitor is undergoing financial stress, change in leadership, or brand repositioning).
Future research could also examine how the personal and social characteristics of CEOs and direc-
tors influence board-friendship ties, or moderate their effects on strategy and performance. Given the
acute lack of diversity among CEOs of public U.S. companies, one might expect a particular lack of
diversity among directors who form board-friendship ties. In fact, while women and minorities now
occupy over 15 % of corporate board seats at large U.S. firms, less than 5 % of the directors in our sam-
ple who form board-friendship ties to competitors were women or racial minorities. As more women
and minorities come to occupy CEO positions over time, the diversity of directors who form board-
friendship ties may gradually increase, though the search costs associated with forming and reconstitut-
ing these ties may increase as well. Moreover, board-friendship ties may become even more valuable to
firms as the diversity of business leadership increases, as demographic differences can otherwise reduce
trust and impede cooperation (Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008).
While the present study focuses on board-friendship ties to rivals, future studies can explore
how board-friendship ties to other firms may influence corporate strategy and performance. For
example, our analyses indicated that board-friendship ties to CEOs of firms in buyer and supplier
industries are significantly and positively associated with subsequent firm performance. Perhaps
such ties enable or strengthen partnerships with buyer and supplier firms in ways that benefit the
focal firm and their partners.13 Board-friendship ties to buyer and supplier firms in other markets
may also facilitate successful entry into new product or geographic markets. Extending the present
13Results for our control variables indicated that firms tend to form more board-friendship ties when they lack formal ties to competi-
tors (e.g., joint ventures). Such formal ties may reduce the need for board-friendship ties, much as tacit collusion can reduce the need
for board-friendship ties at very high levels of industry concentration (our discussion of industry concentration suggested that while
board-friendship ties can be effective when competitive uncertainty is low, for example, when a small number of firms dominate an
industry, firms are less motivated to incur the cost of building such ties because tacit collusion can also be effective). Future studies
could examine whether board-friendship ties have stronger effects on strategic decisions to the extent that firms lack formal connections
to competitors.
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study to explore other strategic implications of board-friendship ties seems to be a promising direc-
tion for future research.
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A. APPENDIX
A.1. MEASURES TO INCREASE THE SURVEY RESPONSE RATE
To ensure the quality of the survey and maximize participation rates, we conducted a pretest of
the questionnaire during in-depth interviews with 26 current or former directors from firms in the
population. We used input from the interviews to improve the layout and instructions of the sur-
vey, and to refine the wording of specific questions (Fowler, 2014). We also obtained the
endorsement of a well-known corporate leader and a major management consulting firm with an
excellent reputation in the area of corporate governance. The invitation to participate described
the survey as part of an established program of research on firm leadership and governance
involving faculty members of multiple leading business schools, and highlighted that thousands
of managers and directors had participated in previous surveys (Fowler, 2014; Greer, Chuchin-
prakarn, & Seshadri, 2000).
A.2. SURVEY MEASURE OF COMPETITIVE UNCERTAINTY
1. How predictable would the actions of competitors be, in the absence of measures to reduce the
uncertainty? [5-point scale: not at all…somewhat…very predictable].
2. How predictable would competition with other firms be, without strategies to reduce the uncer-
tainty? [5-point scale: not at all…somewhat…very predictable].
3. To what extent would it be difficult to anticipate the actions of competitors, without strategies
to reduce the uncertainty? [5-point scale: not at all…somewhat…very much so].
4. To what extent would it be difficult to infer the intentions or plans of competitors from their
actions alone? [5-point scale: not at all…somewhat…very much so].
5. To what extent would it be difficult to predict competition with other firms, in the absence of
measures to reduce the uncertainty? [5-point scale: not at all…somewhat…very much so].
6. [At the focal firm] how much uncertainty would you face in regards to the actions of competi-
tors, in the absence of strategies to reduce the uncertainty? [5-point scale: very little uncertainty…
some uncertainty…a great deal of uncertainty].
A.3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON MEASURES
A.3.1. Control for Resource Dependence
Westphal et al.'s (2006) measure of organizational dependence on resource providers is founded on
Emerson's (1962) theory of dependence power (also Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi,
1983), which suggests that the dependence of actor A on resource provider B increases as (a) the
value of the resource to A increases and (b) alternative providers of the resource decrease. To
gauge alternative providers, Westphal et al.'s (2006) survey measure prompts respondents to (a) list
the firm's inputs and distribution channels, and (b) for each input/channel, list their primary part-
ners (up to 5 per input/channel). We then calculated the four-firm concentration ratio of each part-
ner's industry (Westphal et al., 2006); a higher concentration ratio indicates fewer alternatives for a
particular input or channel (Burt, 1983; Palmer et al., 1995; Porter, 1998). To assess the value of
resources provided by exchange partners, Westphal et al. (2006) developed a four-item scale based
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on Cool and Henderson's (1998) measure of dependence power in supply chains. Specific questions
prompt respondents to assess the impact of each input (or services provided by buyers in a particu-
lar channel) on differentiation of the focal firm's products and/or services (e.g., “The impact of this
input on your product or service differentiation is [5-point scale: weak…strong]”; “To what extent
are the services provided by partners in this channel important to differentiating your products or
services?” [5-point scale: not very important…extremely important]; “This input has a significant
impact on the differentiation of our [products/services]” [5-point scale: strongly disagree…strongly
agree]; “The services provided by partners in this channel have a significant impact on the differen-
tiation of our [products/services]” [5-point scale: strongly disagree…strongly agree]). Westphal
et al. (2006) provided evidence for the inter-rater reliability and convergent validity of items in the
scale. To further assess reliability, we compared the responses of directors at the same firm.
Weighted Kappa coefficients for the survey items ranged from 0.81 to 0.92, indicating a high level
of inter-rater agreement (Fleiss, 1981). Moreover, CFA indicated that all four items loaded on a sin-
gle factor with acceptable interitem reliability. We estimated factor scores using the regression
method. Following Westphal et al. (2006), dependence on resource providers represents the inter-
action between these two variables (Concentration of buyer/supplier industry × Perceived value of
resources provided by the exchange partner). Emerson and Cook's conception of dependence
power would suggest that resource dependence on a supplier or buyer is a function of the interac-
tion between these two variables. In other words, dependence on another organization increases to
the extent that there are few alternative providers of the resource (as indicated by concentration of
the buyer/supplier industry) and the resource is relatively important strategically to the focal firm.
The hypothesized results were unchanged in models that included (a) only concentration of buyer/
supplier industries, (b) only the perceived value of resources provided by exchange partners, or
(c) both main effects, without the interaction term.
A.4. SAMPLE SELECTION MODELS
We estimated a Heckman poisson model (Terza, 1998) in which the selection equation estimates
participation in the study among the larger sample frame of 900 firms (as noted above, firms in
this sample frame are representative of firms in the larger population of large and medium-sized
public U.S. firms on each of the archival variables in our study). As an exclusion restriction, we
used the number of directors on the board nominating committee who had participated in a prior
survey by the first author. This variable was a strong predictor of participation in the current
study, but was not significantly related to board-friendship ties. The Wald test of independent
equations (rho = 0) was not statistically significant (p = 0.346), providing some indication that
sample selection bias is not affecting our results (Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, as noted above,
none of the independent variables from the main equation were significant in the selection equa-
tion (the selection equation did not include the survey measure of competitive uncertainty, which
is only available for study participants; as noted above, however, this measure is strongly corre-
lated with the archival measures of competitive uncertainty, and the latter are not significant pre-
dictors in the selection equation). As discussed above, the independent variable of interest must
be a significant predictor in the selection equation for sample selection bias to exist (Certo et al.,
2016). In any event, the hypothesized effect of competitive uncertainty was strongly significant
in this model.
We also estimated a Heckman probit model in which the selection equation estimates the likeli-
hood of a broken tie among the full sample of board-friendship ties. As an exclusion restriction, we
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used a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the CEO of Alter (the tied to firm) was over age
65. This variable was strongly related to the likelihood of a broken tie, but unrelated to the likelihood
of reconstitution. Again, the likelihood ratio test of independent equations (rho = 0) was not statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.461), and none of the independent variables from the main equation were sig-
nificant in the selection equation, providing some indication that sample selection bias is not
affecting our results (Certo et al., 2016; Wooldridge, 2010). In any case, the effect of competitive
uncertainty remained strongly significant in the model.
A.5. SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE REGARDING DIRECTOR MOTIVES
To further corroborate our argument that an outside director who is a friend of a rival CEO has
motives not to benefit a rival at the focal CEO's expense, in the last iteration of the surveys, we asked
responding directors whether individual members of their board, including directors who form board-
friendship ties, would suffer adverse consequences from helping a competitor at the focal firm's
expense. Ninety-three percent of responding directors agreed or strongly agreed that “if
[an individual director specified in the survey] were to help a competitor at [the focal firm's] expense,
[he/she] would have difficulty obtaining board appointments in the future.” Ninety-four percent
agreed or strongly agreed that “if [an individual director specified in the survey] were to share
TABLE A1 Fixed-effects regression analysis of net incomea
Independent variable
1. Board-friendship ties to chief executive officers (CEOs) of competitors 283.33 [.000]
(17.09)
2. Board-friendship ties to CEOs of firms in buyer/supplier industries 226.10 [.000]
(14.21)
3. Friendship ties between CEO of focal firm and CEOs of competitors 142.48 [.114]
(90.06)
4. Friendship ties between CEO of focal firm and CEOs of firms in buyer/supplier industries 195.94 [.024]
(86.53)
5. Focal CEO's friends on boards of competitors 316.12 [.000]
(32.36)
6. Focal CEO's friends on boards of resource providers 6.24 [.783]
(0.0007)
7. Log of sales 630.26 [.000]
(30.83)
8. Debt to equity ratio 11.255 [.031]
(5.20)
9. R&D ratio 2,266.17 [.030]
(1,044.32)
10. Advertising ratio 5,256.05 [.007]
(1953.92)
11. Capital expenditure 660.69 [.026]
(296.27)





a N = 3054. p values are in brackets (two-tailed tests); standard errors are in parentheses. Year dummies are included.
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sensitive information with a competitor in a way that harms [the focal firm], it would have very nega-
tive consequences for [his/her] reputation”; the same percentage agreed or strongly agreed that “a
director who shares sensitive information with a competitor in a way that disadvantages [the focal
firm] would face negative consequences for [his/her] career.” For the subsample of directors who
form board-friendship ties, 97–98% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with these statements,
with over 85% of respondents strongly agreeing with these statements.
Thus, there was near-consensus among respondents that directors, including those who form
board-friendship ties, would face adverse career consequences if they were to help a competitor at
the focal firm's expense. The expectation of such consequences should deter directors who form
board-friendship ties from using their position to help a competitor in ways that harm the focal firm.
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